Authorial Intention in Literary Hermeneutics: On Two American Theories by José Angel GARCÍA LANDA
Authorial Intention in Literary Hermeneutics: 
On Two American Theories 
  
José Ángel García Landa  
Brown University, 1989  
   
[Originally [Published in Miscelánea 12 (Zaragoza, 1991): 61-92] 
 
1. intention and Intentionality 
  
It will be convenient, before we broach the issue of intention in the theory of literature, 
to contextualize the concept of intention. In the pnomenological tradition inaugurated 
by Brentano, intention is a specific manifestation, among others, of the more general 
phenomenon of Intentionality. (1). Intentionality is a relationship between a cognitive 
representation and a state of affairs, in which the cognitive representation can be said to 
be "about" the state of affairs. Intentional states include perception, belief, desire, 
memory, and intention, among others. Contemporary philosophical schools differ on the 
status of Intentionality. For some thinkers (Ryle, Skinner, Quine), it is a concept which 
has no place in a rigorous theory of knowledge; for others, there is no understanding 
human activity without it. Let me side with the latter without further explanation, and 
say that the differences within this second current, .g. between John R. Searle's 
mentalism and Daniel C. Dennett's "intentional stance," are largely irrelevant for the 
purposes of this work. As a rule, I will adopt Searl 's idiom, according to which 
meanings are actual representations in the brain, although I think that Searle's theory 
could benefit from a greater degree of self-consciousness about its own heuristic status. 
This methodological choice has the advantage of setting in a larger frame the theory of 
speech acts, which I think is an important meeting ground for hermeneutics, linguistics, 
philosophy and literary theory. 
For instance, both speech acts and Intentional states in general can be represented as a 
modalized propositional content. (2). My assertion "John loves Sally" (a speech act) can 
be paraphrased metalinguistically as "I assert that John loves Sally." Similarly, my 
belief that John loves Sally (an Intentional state) can be paraphrased as "I believe that 
John loves Sally." This paraphrase can be said to be Intentional, too. We must 
distinguish the original Intentionality of Intentional states themselves from the derived 
Intentionality of their semiotic representation (cf. Searle 1983a: 21). The Intentionality 
of a mental belief is original; that of language or literature is derived. Meaning is the 
relationship between primary and derived Intentionality, between an Intentional state 
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and its semiotic representation. As we shall see, this definition allows for a variety of 
types of meaning. 
intention-with-a-lowercase-i is a kind of Intentionality. Therefore, my intention to love 
Sally, which itself is non-linguistic, can be represented linguistically and rather trivially 
as "I intend to love Sally." Searle sees some Intentional states as more central, simple or 
primordial than others. These basic intentional state , such as perception or belief, can 
be a component part of several other more complex or secondary (3) Intentional 
phenomena. Searle hesitates about the status of intention in this respect. First, he 
presents intention as an elaborate instance of such secondary Intentionality, and isolates 
in it the components of belief and desire ("Bel" and "Des" in his notation): 
If I intend to do A , I must believe it is possible for me to do A and I must in some 
sense want to do A . But we get only a very partial analysis of intention from the 
following: 
Intend (I do A ) > Bel (<> I do A ) & Des (I do A ) 
The extra element derives from the special causal role of intention in producing our 
behavior. . . . (1983a, 34) 
But immediately afterwards he reverses the priorities, and speaks of desire as an 
evolved or bleached-out intention (1983a, 36). Fortuna ely we do not have to solve this 
problem. What is more relevant to our purposes hereis that intention-with-a-small-i is 
defined by Searle in its ordinary sense, preceding action as the aim before the shot. This 
is prior intention. There is another kind of intentionality: intention in the action. Even in 
those instances of human agency where there is not a dis inct prior intention, we want to 
characterize the action as intentional-with-a-lowercase-i. In such cases, Searle argues, 
"the intention in action just is the Intentional content of the action; the action and the 
intention are inseparable . . ." (1983a, 84). Intention in action does not have to be 
present in the subject's consciousness: "Sometimes one performs intentional actions 
withouth our conscious experience of doing so" (1983a, 91). This is often the case in 
complex actions which demand a variety of minor, instrumental actions. I may 
consciously intend to drive to work, though not necessarily to turn on the starter. This 
would still be an intentional action. In turning onthe starter, I might set off a booby trap 
installed by some terrorist--this would count as an unintentional action. However, not 
every unforeseen consequence of our basic actions is adequately described as non-
intentional; for instance, on my way home I might suddenly become the only European 
born on the first of June 1961 who happens to be looking at a shop window. If we 
bracket away the privileged virtual observer of this circumstance, it does not even count 
as an action. In Searle's words, "we count an action as unintentional under those aspects 
which, though not intended, are, so to speak, within t e field of possibility of the 
intentional actions of the agent as seen from our pint of view" (1983a, 102). Or, from 
another perspective, "an unintentional action is an intentional action, whether successful 
or not, which has aspects which were not intended in it" (1983a, 108). 
When we speak of the intentionality of a literary work, we do not mean simply prior 
intentionality, but neither are we referring simply to the Intentioal nature of the work 
insofar as it is a semiotic phenomenon. We mean intention in the action, but in a sense 
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which remains to be further elaborated, one which is specific to the structure of 
language. 
The Intentionality of language is derived. This means that, even in the simplest of 
speech acts, there is a double layer of Intentionality: the Intentional state expressed, and 
the intention with which the utterance is made. Moreover, intention (and not only 
Intentionality) is inherent to semiotic phenomena. According to Searle, "the mind 
imposes Intentionality on entities that are not intrinsically Intentional by intentionally 
conferring the conditions of satisfaction of the expressed psychological state upon the 
external physical activity" (1983a, 27). In the case of language, the intentional 
association between signifier and signified soon becomes automatic, an unconscious 
intention in the act. Searle defines Intentional causation as that causation in which one 
element is an Intentional state and the other is its condition of satisfaction or part of its 
conditions of satisfaction. (1983a, 122). The peculiarity of the Intentional causation of 
semiotic communication is that an Intentional state is the condition of satisfaction of the 
Intentional state that causes it. The (highly conventionalized) Intentional causality of a 
red light is satisfied only if it causes in the motorist a belief that he is required to stop. 
Therefore, the intention inherent in the red light is not properly speaking to produce the 
effect of stopping the motorist, but to communicate to the motorist that he must stop. As 
Searle has noted, it is a mistake to assume that "te in entions that matter for meaning 
are the intentions to produce effects on audiences" (1983a, 161). 
Complex Intentional systems are thus constituted by superposing different orders of 
intentionality. With the example of the red light, we are in our third layer of 
Intentionality: the original Intentional state of the sender of a message, the intention 
intrinsic to the constitution of the sign, and the intention to communicate a meaning 
through that sign. In the case of language, the issue becomes considerably more 
complicated, as we shall see later: language is so conventionalized that our 
communicative intention is directed at the performance of speech acts. For the moment, 
it is sufficient to say that intentions are inherent in the structure of language, and not 
merely in the psychological phenomena which precede or attend its use. The use and 
meaning of language (even of a term such as "intentional fallacy") rests on a series of 
practices, specific choices and purposes, which have become conventional to the extent 
of being taken for granted. 
  
  
2. The Intentional Fallacy Fallacy 
Authorial intention is a central concept in the classical theory of hermeneutics 
developed in the Romantic age. The classical accounts by Schleiermacher (1805-33, rpt. 
1986) and Boeckh (1886) conceive interpretation as the reconstruction of the author's 
original conception. Emilio Betti voices their contemporary heritage best: 
"interpretation becomes a collaboration that the addresee extends to the author of the 
statement, inasmuch as he is called upon to reawaken in his own mind the idea 
conceived and expressed by the mind of the author" (1988, 32). Interpretation includes 
the reconstruction of the author's intentions. However, it is not restricted to the 
reconstruction of the conscious intent or the communicative interest of the author: 
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"Even a 'manifestation' devoid of such interest and  behavior not in itself directed 
toward making a thought recognizable to others may be the object of interpretation" 
(1988, 33). Unintentional, implicit or symptomatic meanings resulting from such 
manifestations can be the object of hermeneutics. 
This conception has long been challenged, often in a misguided way, by non-
intentionalist theories of literary meaning. The modern discussion of the role of 
authorial intention in the activity of the critic is usually taken to start with the 
aestheticist reaction against romantic individualism, which was an essentially 
intentionalist current. This reaction is linked to li erary modernism and can be seen 
taking shape in various forms during the nineteenth a d the first half of the twentienth 
century. It is seen, for instance, in the work of Rger Fry, who once said,"I'm certain 
that the only meanings that are worth anything in a work of art, are those that the artist 
himself knows nothing about" (4) or in T. S. Eliot's strictures against "interpretation" 
(Eliot 1957). The debate has assumed different shapes, such as a contention between 
"historicist" and "critical" theories of interpretation, or between advocates and 
opponents of psychoanalysis, Marxism, structuralism or deconstruction--doctrines 
which challenge the traditional concept of individual intention. In America the most 
influential anti-intentionalist ideas came from a "critical" movement who opposed 
positivist scholarship--the New Critics. 
The best known and most influential theoretical statement of the anti-intentionalist 
school is W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley's article "The Intentional Fallacy" 
(1946; rpt. 1967). (5). The authors summarized their position in the statement that "the 
design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for 
judging the success of a work of literary art" (1967, 3). There has been considerable 
debate as to what was the precise scope of this critical axiom or doctrine, as well as its 
legitimacy. Other critics have found that it is just a  easy to hold that "the design of the 
author is both available and desirable." (6). The extreme intentionalist position will 
have to be qualified, too. The meaning of a poem is not always the meaning the poet 
intended it to have; the poet is not always in control of everything which is at work in 
the poem (Redpath 1976, 17), and he is definitely not in control of an anti-intentionalist 
interpreter. 
Let us note first that Wimsatt and Beardsley take "intention" to mean first of all prior 
intention, the original intention of the author, previous to the actual composition of the 
work, or the personal intention of the author in those cases where it is different from any 
intention which may be inferred from the work itself. (7). Sources of information as to 
the author's intention which are external to the work itself are not relevant for the 
judgement of the work. Rejection of intention is meant as a rejection of psychologism, 
in favour of intrinsic criticism--of criticism based on the analysis of the text itself. Anti-
intentionalism presents itself therefore as a favouring of public conventions over private 
ones. 
This is not the main sense in which I hold authorial intention to be decisive to the 
critical enterprise. Alastair Fowler has noted that "intention means different things at 
different stages of composition." (8). It also means different things from the point of 
view of the author at work and the from the point of view of the interpreter. "Intention" 
understood as a working project of the author's is not a concern of the interpreter, except 
insofar as it may have some kind of bearing on the intention assumed to be present in 
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the work. This first kind of intention may nevertheless be a concern of the critic. 
Wimsatt and Beardsley's article is mainly concerned with "intention" seen from the 
author's pole, with intention "extrinsic" to the work. The response of intentionalist 
critics to "The Intentional Fallacy" has been to shw that intention is, to use Wimsatt's 
own terms, intrinsic to the literary work, that the public sharability of language is not 
separable from a concept of intention, something which is neglected by anti-
intentionalist critics. (9). In short, writing literature involves an itention in the action 
which is part of the communicative structure of the work. Intention is not merely 
something which precedes the work or exists apart from it; neither is intentionalism a 
blind submission to any meaning an author may claim for his work. It is a requirement 
to see the work in the right context. (10). For Gadamer, too, the opposition between 
intentional meaning and unintended meaning is too simplistic, unsatisfactory (1988, 58). 
An extended speech act theory (Pratt 1977; Harris 1988) can help us conceive of an 
intentionalism which is not narrowly and exclusively psychological. 
As for Wimsatt and Beardsley's denunciation of psychologism, it remains a mystery 
how Wimsatt and Beardsley ever expected a historical psychic intention to be a threat at 
all for criticism if they believe that it is never available (cf. Peckham 156). It is also 
significant that Wimsatt and Beardsley assume that an unfulfilled intention is not 
recognizable without recourse to external evidence. (11). Any of a range common 
phenomena, such as bad verse which tries hard to be g od, can serve as an example that 
this is not the case. 
Let us note, too, that Wimsatt and Beardsley are mainly concerned with evaluation. 
However, the intentional fallacy is soon applied quite naturally to the realm of 
interpretation, since evaluation is logically linked to interpretation (Peckham 1976, 
141). And in his revision of the earlier doctrine, Wimsatt extended the application of the 
intentional fallacy to the realm of interpretation: "The design or intention of the author 
is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging either the meaning or the 
value of a work of literary art" (Wimsatt 1976, 136). 
Wimsatt and Beardsley are, furthermore, concerned with the criticism of poetry, or 
more widely, with aesthetic criticism. In their account, poetry simply 
is, in the sense that we have no excuse for inquiring what part is intended or meant. 
Poetry is a feat of style by which a complex of meaning is handled all at once. . . . In 
this respect poetry differs from practical messages, which are successful if and only if 
we correctly infer the intention. They are more abstract than poetry. (12) 
Moreover, whatever personal thoughts or attitudes ar  inferred from the poem itself are 
to be attributed "to the dramatic speaker, and if to the author at all, only by an act of 
biographical inference" (1967, 5). The poem does not belong to the critic, but neither 
does it belong to the author. It rests on the publicly specifiable conventions of meaning. 
By means of an unconscious sleight of hand, Wimsatt and Beardsley's discussion 
reduces the function of criticism to an inquiry about the value of a work of art, 
disregarding the interpretive moment. (13). They reject as uninteresting one form of 
evaluation, the inquiry as to whether an artist realiz d his (original) intentions. In their 
view, criticism must evaluate the final result, thepoem and not the (original, extrinsic) 
intention. "The evaluation of the work of art remains public; the work is measured 
against something outside the author" (1967, 10). 
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This valuation of public meaning is illegitimately identified with intrinsic criticism: in 
an even more amazing sleight of hand, "internal" is identified with "public"; "external" 
with "private" (1967, 10). Hirsch has noted that (in its main claim) Wimsatt and 
Beardsley's argument is not directed against verbal intentional meaning, but against 
irrelevant meanings. They contend "not that the infrred meanings are private, but that 
they are probably not the author's meanings" (Hirsch 1967, 16). Wimsatt and Beardsley, 
however, would reject the notion of "the author's" meanings, and would insist on the 
public nature of language. This public nature is what makes the notion of intrinsic 
criticism possible at all. The language of the poem has to be accepted as internal 
evidence; semi-private meanings of words are an intermediary case although ultimately 
they must be accepted as public (since we know them) and intrinsic: "The meaning of 
words is the history of words, and the biography of an author, his use of a word, and the 
associations which the word had for him, are part of the word's history and meaning" 
(Wimsatt and Beardsley 1967, 10). The historical meaning of the work defined in this 
way is not "internal" to the text for Wimsatt and Beardsley's point of view. It is an 
intermediary type of evidence, not wholly external, but then not wholly internal either, 
because Wimsatt and Beardsley are considering the word as such, as a piece of langue, 
instead of seeing it as an instance of use in a text, a contextually defined parole. (14). 
The historical meaning, that is, is only "a part" of the meaning of the word even from 
the purely interpretive point of view. Ahistoricism rears its head in this conception. 
But what really gives the whole theory away is a note appended to the text just quoted: 
"And the history of words after a poem is written may contribute meanings which if 
relevant to the original pattern should not be ruled out by a scruple about intention" 
(Wimsatt and Beardsley 1967, 281). Notes are always telling about the deep intention of 
an author. It is clear now that Wimsatt and Beardsley'  concept of criticism sets 
aesthetic value foremost. The interpretation of the authorial meaning is secondary, even 
negligible if necessary. The critical act may evaluate the poem according to an 
accidental meaning or significance which it has acquired by virtue of the evolution of 
language. It is noticeable that in the note "intention" refers no longer to the sense they 
had started with, "whatever is or had been in the author's mind apart from the intentional 
acts publicly specified in the work itself." The note contradicts the apparent meaning of 
the text, if not its real thrust. The text gives a (qualified) historicist definition of 
meaning, a concern for the meaning of the word in the author's context. (15). It comes 
close to a dangerous point where Wimsatt and Beardsley would be hard pressed not to 
accept evidence external to the text: those cases wh re a biographical or other 
"extrinsic" remark throws light on the original context of composition and therefore on 
the meaning of the word. (16). The note wipes away this concern for the authorial / 
historical meaning of the word. All "patterned" meanings, whether historically justified 
or not, are legitimate. (17). Anti-intentionalism therefore results in anti-historicism. 
This doctrine rests on a very specific conception of language, which has sometimes 
been called "semantic autonomism." According to this conception, once it is detached 
from its enunciator, language becomes autonomous; the author has no further rights 
over his utterance. This conception is shared by some structuralists critics. Roland 
Barthes speaks in this respect of "the death of the author." Barthes sees the author's 
enunciation, writing, as an empty process which needs no interlocutors. Conversely, the 
reader is free to make of the text whatever he wants. I  this view, literature is not 
communication, and interpretation is a senseless activity: "Once the Author is removed, 
the claim to decipher a text becomes quite futile" (Barthes 1977a, 147). The critic's 
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meaning is as good as the author's. The best meaning, i  these critics' view, overrides 
the authorial meaning, especially if the authorial meaning has to be determined by 
means of information not readily accessible to the reader. (18). 
This might imply, as I have said, a disparagement of historicist considerations, but in 
fact it does not, or at least Wimsatt and Beardsley do not intend this result. They do not 
rule out the knowledge of the author's original culture as an essential asset for the 
interpreter--they presuppose it, they presuppose a competent reader. A great deal of 
historical and general contextual knowledge is to be taken for granted if this view must 
make any sense. Even conceding the dictionary meaning of the words to be "intrinsic" 
to the poem (a major concession which is taken for granted by the New Critics) we still 
need far more than dictionary meaning would allow in order to make sense of a literary 
work. An hypothetical dictionary-reader would fall short of Wimsatt and Beardsley' 
expectations. They need an encyclopedic reader, who knows, for instance, that the 
"trepidation of the spheares" in the Donne poem they comment on in their article refers 
at all to astronomy. The poem does not say so, but it is nevertheless an internal element 
of meaning to Wimsatt and Beardsley because they assume that the reader knows. (19). 
Wimsatt and Beardsley, therefore, do not erase the difference between authorial 
meaning and other kinds of meaning as far as interpretation is concerned. Neither do 
they, for that matter, stress it as a meaningful issue. They are not really concerned with 
interpretation. (20). And criticism, in its evaluative side, should in their view ignore this 
difference. 
The critical act would therefore consist of:
1) Interpreting the text of the poem to determine the range of possible interpretations, 
whether of authorial meaning, meaning or significance. 
2) An evaluation of these interpretations, without privileging the authorial meaning of 
the poem. 
But, given the intrinsically intentional nature of language, the creation of a kind of 
virtual author is presupposed in 2). The result is that the best meaning is regarded as if it 
were the authorial meaning of the poem. It is clear th t with such assumptions about the 
aims of interpretation the difference between authorial meaning and other kinds of 
meaning need not be a basic critical concept. At bes , as in Wimsatt and Beardsley, it is 
anecdotic; at worst, as in some of their followers, it is ignored, not understood. 
Interpretive anarchy is kept within bounds by presupposing a competent reader, who 
will generally give a historically plausible interpretation--even if his aesthetic aims 
allow him to occasionally improve the poem with thecomplicity of history. This kind of 
interpretation is not very different from the adopti n of an intentional stance towards 
mechanical artifacts whose structure we ignore (cf. Dennett 1987, 15ff.). The intentional 
stance allows us to make sense of the artifact's behaviour, but at the cost of endowing it 
with a greater degree of consciousness than we would want. Paradoxically, the New 
Critical "intentional fallacy" has as its concominta  phenomenon an overestimation of 
the authorial intention and deliberation such as may be found for instance in Stanley 
Fish's book on Milton (Fish 1967). Theodore Redpath notes that an author cannot be 
said to have intended everything a reader may find in his work--even if the author 
claimed so himself. The object of Redpath's criticism is John Dewey's aesthetic theory 
(21) --no author is known to have claimed this. Perhaps the closest example was T.S. 
 García Landa – Authorial intention 8 
Eliot, who had a critical axe to grind and none the less saw fit to provide The Waste 
Land with notes. The concept of intention is in one sense i evitably linked to at least a 
potential consciousness and deliberation. For the sense in which it is not, I will speak of 
deep intention. (22). The two must not be confused; otherwise we will end up 
constructing a fictional author-figure tailored according to the critic´s needs. 
It should be clear by now that the "intentional falacy" is no such fallacy. It is a 
particular choice of what is to count as validity in interpretation. The New Critical anti-
intentionalism is another choice, with a different kind of assumptions and aims, and 
which is not primarily concerned with hermeneutic validity--a perfectly legitimate 
enterprise if it is done in a self-conscious way and with a clear methodology and aims. 
(23). Wimsatt and Beardsley's doctrine in "The Intentional Fallacy," however, is itself a 
fallacy to the extent that the authors present their "s minal ukase" (24) as an objective 
critical principle and the universal rule for literary interpretation. Hermeden has noted 
that "the fundamental issues involved in a stand on intention are nonempirical: they 
concern normative questions." (25). No new data will solve the problem; the status of 
intention in interpretation has to be decided by the interpreter, in view of the aims he 
sets to his activity. In Hirsch's terms, the reader need not try to realize the author's 
intended meaning. The question of whether he should r not is an ethical question, 
which is answered affirmatively by Hirsch: "Unless there is a powerful overriding value 
in disregarding an author's intention (i.e. original meaning), we who interpret as a 
vocation should not disregard it." (26). Nevertheless, I would somewhat qualify this 
position. There are advances made on conceptual isses, too. Analyzing them is not a 
fruitless task. The issues are now much clearer than when Wimsatt and Beardsley 
denounced the intentional fallacy: a greater degree of shared assumptions has been 
discovered, and some extreme positions have been abandoned. And even if there are 
several correct modes of constructing or using intention, experience tells us that they are 
not all equally correct in all interpretive contexts. 
It is an axiom of classical hermeneutics that interpr tation logically precedes evaluation. 
But it has been noted by Newton-De Molina that "this logical condition of priority may 
tend to elide the full human importance of an awkward truth: that the relevant 
information upon which we base particular interpretations is not always prior in time to 
particular evaluations." (27). The consequence is that "unless evaluations are to b
eternally postponed they must always be accepted, in some senses, as generically 
provisional" (1976, xi). However, it must be recognized that things work in a slightly 
different way: 
a) Evaluation cannot (or should not!) precede that first step of interpretation that we call 
understanding. It is clear that otherwise we call it prejudice. 
b) Some evaluations are more provisional than others. The evaluation of a passage 
during the reading process may be highly provisional, and the psychological attitudes of 
any person towards a work may change a great deal at different moments of his life. But 
the considered evaluation given by a critic in a scholarly article after several careful 
readings and taking into account a previous evaluative tradition is, I think, in a much 
more definite relationship to the critic's interpretation of the text. Ideally, it has gone 
through a process of suspension of judgement until a  interpretation is established. But 
the decisive fact is that this evaluation is public and fixed, and is based on an 
interpretation of the work which is accessible to other critics. By definition (because of 
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the logical priority of interpretation) Critic no. 2 assumes that Critic no. 1's evaluation is 
grounded on that particular concretization of the work --not on Critic no. 2's own 
concretization of the work. And evaluations may be more generally shared than 
interpretations, and rest on the more general interpretive level of understanding, because 
precisely one of the functions of great literature in our culture is to generate diverse 
interpretations, which therefore can affect the basic evaluation of the work only 
peripherally. 
Interpreting with evaluation in mind leads to a confusion of aesthetic and interpretive 
criteria. This is evident in Wimsatt and Beardsley, and also in some of their critics. In 
spite of his misgivings about the rejection of biographical evidence, Emilio Roma 
shares with Wimsatt and Beardsley the assumption that 
there is at least one reason which counts for and against interpretations, namely, the 
reading fails because it does not account for certain significant passages of the poem, 
and hence does not bring out the richness of the poem. This reason is essentially 
evaluative, and at the same time it does not go "outside" of the poem. (28) 
But we might well ask for whom are those passages significant. The answer seems to 
be: for a critic with Roma's criteria of validity--which may or may not be "in" the poem, 
but which surely need not be in the author's creativ  intention. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that in the last analysis Roma endorses Wimsatt and Beardsley's concept of 
interpretation and their definition of meaning as something which is decided by the 
critic on the basis of criteria which are ultimately aesthetic: "the way a poet and his 
contemporaries understood a word or passage is relevant vidence for making a decision 
about the meaning of a poetic utterance. I do not say that this is always relevant 
evidence" (1976, 85-86). Translated into our own terms, this would read: "The present-
day significance of a work resulting from the convetions of academic interpretation 
sometimes has more aesthetic relevance than its historical meaning." This is true if our 
notion of aesthetic value allows itself, as it does for Roma or Wimsatt and Beardsley, a 
measure of independence from historical and cognitive considerations. My own view is 
that the two notions of aesthetic relevance have to be kept apart. We may very well 
rewrite a poem in our imagination and then evaluate it, but a historicist aesthetics can 
hardly afford to do this. Its object is not so simple; it involves a determination of the 
conditions of artistic production and the assumptions about art in the original context of 
the work, an evaluation of the work in those terms, and then a study of the "life" of the 
work and its transformations in the uses to which it is put by different readers and 
critical projects. (29). The anti-intentionalist, aestheticist project is ju t one more of 
these historical attitudes to art, and it does not fare very well from an objectivist 
perspective. Aesthetic value is usually grounded on the coherence of the text, a 
coherence which usually is the product of the collab r tion between writer and critic. 
Coherent intepretations are usually reached in this way, but, as Hirsch has noted, 
coherence is not a sufficiently objective criterion of validity--an interpretation may be 
both coherent and wrong. (30). 
An interpretation, we may conclude, must strive towards coherence and completeness, 
but in doing so it must not build a perfect structure with the data internal to the work 
while it conflicts with historical, psychological or cultural assumptions that we might 
wish to hold. (31). Its hypotheses must remain translatable into other areas of 
knowledge, with the aim of increasing communication in culture at large. 
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3. Objectivist Hermeneutics and Criticism: E. D. Hirsch 
The best discipline to keep our own aesthetic or ideological concerns from giving an 
obvious bias to the interpretive activity, as far as this is possible, is to consider the 
phases of the critical activity as logically and chronologically sequential activities. In 
Hirsch's words, "Understanding (and therefore interpretation, in the strict sense of the 
word) is both logically and psychologically prior to what is generally called criticism" 
(1967, 209). It has been rightly said that there can be no pure interpretation, that 
description will always contain a measure of evaluation. (32). This is true. It is none the 
less the case that description as such is not evaluation as such. Refusing to concede the 
possibility of this conceptual distinction is the first step towards the collapse of the 
distinction between understanding and inventing--throw the thrust towards objective 
description away and communication is likely to follow suit (cf. Hirsch 1967, 26). 
Hirsch is the main theorizer of objective interpretation in the English-speaking 
academy. (33). Hirsch's basic interpretive rule is the distinction between "meaning" and 
significance. In the first version of his theory (1967), "meaning" is "meaning in the 
author's context"; significance is "meaning for us, today." "Meaning" is the result of 
interpretation, which is logically prior to the inquiry for significance: 
Meaning is that which is represented by a text; it is what the author meant by his use of 
a particular sign sequence; it is what the signs represent. Significance, on the other 
hand, names a relationship between that meaning, and a person, or a conception, or a 
situation, or indeed anything imaginable. (1967, 8) 
Hirsch relates this distinction to similar differences established by other theorists: 
Boeckh's "interpretation" and "criticism," Frege's "sense" and "reference," and Husserl's 
"inner" and "outer horizons of meaning." It is one of Hirsch's main tenets that 
significance is variable while "meaning" is fixed. Significance changes as each critic 
relates the work to his own interests or to his own knowledge of the subject-matter the 
original writer was dealing with (cf. Hirsch 1967, 58f., 63); this accounts for concepts 
such as the life of a work of art, which is relative to the changing significance of the 
work. "Meaning", on the other hand, is a fixed historical fact: "an author's original 
meaning cannot change" (1967, 9. Cf. Fowler 1976, 252). It does not change through 
the life of the text--for Hirsch, history is already written and cannot be unwritten. (34). 
Later, Hirsch enlarges the sense of the word "meaning" to include other meanings 
besides the authorial. This comes nearer to the sense in which I use the terms. Meaning 
is now "that which a text is taken to represent" (1976, 79). However, the 
determinateness of the author's meaning still plays the same fundamental role in his 
theory. And Hirsch's 1976-meaning is still a principle of fixity as opposed to a principle 
of change, significance, or "meaning-related-to-something-else" (1976, 80). 
Hirsch takes great care to distinguish this relation between authorial meaning and the 
author from any psychologistic conception of intentio  or meaning: it is the difference 
defined by Husserl between an intentional act and a psychical act (Hirsch 1967, 217-
218). The authorial verbal meaning is, in Husserlian terms, an intentional object; it is 
"that aspect of a speaker's 'intention' which, under linguistic conventions may be shared 
by others" (Hirsch 1967, 218). This meaning is Intentional in the sense Husserl gives to 
the word. It may not have been wholly conscious for the author himself at any given 
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moment, but it must belong to his "horizon of expectations": "The interpreter's aim, 
then, is to posit the author's horizon and carefully exclude his own accidental 
associations" (1967, 222). The author's Intentionalty does not necessarily warrant 
"consciousness of meaning": "there are usually components of an author's intended 
meaning that he is not conscious of" (1967, 21). Hirsch explains this apparent 
contradiction by means of the notion of typification. The author's Intentional acts (in the 
Husserlian sense) by which he wills a particular meaning into being are not directed 
towards each aspect of his intended [Intentional] meaning, but to a typical whole: "the 
acceptability of a submeaning depends upon the author's notion of the subsuming type 
whenever this notion is sharable in the particular linguistic circumstances" (1967, 49). 
Verbal meaning as such is nothing other than "a willed type which an author expresses 
by linguistic symbols and which can be understood by another through these symbols." 
(35). The author's use of this type must be learned, and this is possible because types are 
eminently sharable (1967, 66ff.). The consequence for the definition of "conscious 
intention" is that very often we cannot be sure whether a meaning was conscious or 
unconscious. In these cases, according to Hirsch, the distinction is irrelevant (1967, 51). 
Moreover, the authorial meaning does not consist solely f representational elements: 
"Defined in Husserl's terms, 'meaning' embraces not o ly intentional objects but also 
the species of intentional acts which sponsor those intentional objects. . . . Subjective 
feeling, tone, mood, and value, are constitutive of meaning in its fullest sense" (1976, 
8). This we might relate to Searle's analysis of intentional acts into a proposition and a 
modal element (1983a, 5ff.). 
There is a difference between Hirsch's concern for the public specifiability of meaning 
and a similar concern as it was voiced by Wimsatt and Beardsley. For Hirsch, meaning 
is public, but never completely so. The text cannot be regarded as a piece of language, a 
system of possibilities or a verbal icon; it is tied to the author's original meaning (1967, 
24). Wimsatt explicitly upholds the interpretation f a work as a piece of langue. 
Apparently, if we interpreted a work as an instance of parole, the words "would never. . 
. make sense to anybody but the author himself" (Wimsatt 1976, 138). The absurdity of 
this statement hardly needs to be pointed out afterthe development of discourse analysis 
during the past twenty years. For Hirsch, the text is not a segment of Saussurean l gue, 
but an instance of parole (1967, 232), a historically limited phenomenon which must be 
understood in its context. The (present-day) communal context as such is not a 
sufficient criterion: 
It is therefore not only sound but necessary for the interpreter to inquire, "What in all 
probability did the author mean? Is the pattern of emphases I construe the author's 
pattern?" But it is both incorrect and futile to inquire, "What does the language of the 
text say?" That question can have no determinate answer. (1967, 235) 
Hirsch's conception of a historicized meaning also makes irrelevant Raval's contention 
that "Hirsch's authorial intention does not entail a biographical person but rather a 
'speaking subject'" which is "not really distinguishable form the New Critical persona" 
(1981, 64). The New Critical persona is more or less freely constructed by the reader; 
Hirsch's persona is the result of the author adopting d scursive conventions which must 
be understood in the terms of the culture and context where they originated. The ethics 
of interpretation starts with the respect towards the author's meaning and our efforts to 
grasp it objectively (cf. Scholes 1990, 50). 
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Unless we regard things in this way, Hirsch argues, there would be no criterion to 
determine a correct interpretation. This claim is the polar opposite of Barthes's doctrine 
that "a text's unity lies not in its origin, but in its destination" (1977a, 148). Focusing on 
the reader's activity without a reference to the author's meaning does not unify the text; 
rather, it disintegrates it completely. In a vein similar to Barthes', Horton (1979, x) 
argues that although meaning is ultimately context-bound, the boundlessness of the 
context prevents its determination in practice. Hirsch would accept this claim for 
meaning in general, but not for the concrete authorial meaning. Its historical typicality is 
what makes interpretation possible. For Hirsch, the text is only fixed at one point, the 
author's meaning. That is why this is an indispensable criterion for the validation of 
interpretations. We have seen,though, that there might be other criteria--an aesthetic 
criterion can determine that the "best interpretation" s the correct one. Hirsch simply 
has different assumptions as to the aims of criticism. The validity of a reading is not to 
be equated with its aesthetic excellence (1967, 5). Criticism must resist the temptation 
to mix evaluative and interpretive criteria. It must speak with the voice of reason, and 
distinguish the text as it is before the critical activity form the text as it is after the 
critical activity. Meaning cannot exist in a void. If a critic rejects the author's meaning, 
he will inevitably substitute his own (1967, 4). But doing this is indulging in a kind of 
vicarious authorship. (36). This would not be "intepretation" in Hirsch's sens, and so 
we can concede his point that there is a specific cognitive activity which consists in the 
identification of the authorial intention. Creative writing and criticism are two different 
enterprises, even if they share some common elements. In the last analysis, the 
interpretive theories of Wimsatt and Beardsley and those of Stanley Fish (1980) rest on 
a shared assumption: that there is no essential difference between interpretation and 
creation. Hirsch's is radically opposed: interpretation and creation are essentially 
different activities and they must be carefully distinguished from each other: 
"Interpretation is the construction of another's meaning" (1967, 244). This meaning 
cannot be constructed partially. Either it is ours or it is the author's: for Hirsch, 
Gadamer's theory of Horizontverschmelzung is a logical contradiction, since it 
presupposes a contact with something--the author's pe spective--which is at the same 
time declared to be inaccessible. In Hirsch's view, we do not understand the meaning of 
others in our own terms, though we do value it in our wn terms. (37). 
Some phenomenological critics have strongly stressed th  related notion that reading 
involves a contact with another mind. For Georges Poulet, reading is an activity with a 
peculiar ontology of its own--it is an immersion in a conscience different from our own, 
and it requires total submission to the author's cons iousness as it emerges from the 
work. "I myself, although conscious of whatever [the consciousness inherent in the 
work] may be conscious of, play a much more humble rol  content to record passively 
all that is going on in me" (Poulet 1980, 47). A similar definition of interpretation is 
found in Maurice Blanchot. (38). These conceptions sound sometimes nearly mystical. 
But not all theories of interpersonal communication are drawn along these lines. Few 
people would agree that the reading process itself nvolves such passivity on the part of 
the reader as Poulet would have it. Dennett's version of the way the gap to the other's 
meaning is bridged is more satisfactory: it is relativistic to a degree, and stresses the 
activity of the intepreter: "when we interpret others we do so not so much by theorizing 
about them as by using ourselves as analog computers that produce a result. Wanting to 
know more about your frame of mind, I put myself in it, or as close to being in it as I 
can muster, and see what I thereupon think (want, do...)" (1987, 100). The 
hermeneutical tradition since Schleiermacher already stressed that even the simple 
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retrieval of meaning is an active process resting o the play of hypotheses and data, not 
an act of "reception" (Schleiermacher 1986, 113-17). 
If the interpretation of the other in his own terms already requires a degree of activity, 
criticising him is an eminently active and assertiv activity. In Hirsch's model, the 
critical phase succeeds the interpretive one. Hirsch, I think, would not contest the claim 
that "conceding authorial privilege means giving the author the first word, not the last" 
(Fowler 1976, 250). The study of meaning is only a necessary preliminary to that part of 
the critic's activity which has direct public value, the application of meaning, 
significance (1976, 19). This is an essential, not merely legitimate, function of the critic. 
Only, the study of significance is an activity different from the interpretation of 
meaning, and must be carefully distinguished from it. (39). 
A last, important characteristic of Hirsch's theory is his probabilism. Authorial meaning 
is fixed and determinate, but we never know whether we have construed it in a correct 
way. On this matter there are only various degrees of probability. (40). Nevertheless, 
knowledge is possible: "It is a logical mistake to confuse the possibility of certainty in 
understanding with the impossibility of understanding." (41). 
Beardsley's attempt to refute Hirsch's theory of interpretation is in my view 
unsuccessful. He is not addressing the issues Hirsch is concerned with. His three 
arguments against Hirsch's thesis only prove that the reader of a text may construct 
verbal meanings which were not intended by the author--something which I think is 
self-evident to Hirsch. The real difference lies in the fact that Beardsley counts these 
constructions as valid interpretations, whereas Hirch does not. Just like in "The 
Intentional Fallacy," Beardsley is concerned with the aesthetic value of a reading, not 
with its successful retrieval of the authorial meaning. Again we find the same ahistorical 
aestheticism at work: in pushing the authorial willout of his consideration, Beardsley is 
in fact pushing out the historical context of the utterance. Let me show this through a re-
cycling of one of Beardsley's examples: 
An ambiguous text does not become any less ambiguous because its author wills one of 
the possible meanings. Will as he will, he cannot will away ambiguity. There is 
something odd about the notion of "willing" a meaning. It is as though we ordered 
someone, "Say 'cat' and mean dog." Can one do that? How does one do it? True I can 
say, "Vote for Senator Kennedy!" and think of Edward Kennedy. Do I thereby make the 
word "Kennedy" in that utterance mean Edward Kennedy ? That is quite impossible. 
(1970, 29) 
The perspective is all wrong. An ambiguous text does become less ambiguous if we find 
out that the author had willed one of the possible meanings. We do not usually need to 
will away ambiguity because our utterances are calcul ted to be unambiguous in the 
context in which they are used. Suppose a dog is barking, and someone observes, "The 
cat is barking." This is a puzzling behaviour, and  number of intepretations could be 
offered. No doubt some of them would afford a great deal of aesthetic satisfaction. But 
if a moment before we had heard Beardsley order our man "Say 'cat' and mean dog," 
there would be nothing much left to interpret. In the example of the Kennedys, 
Beardsley is thinking of the ambiguous reference of the sentence at the time he wrote 
his essay--it could have meant Edward or Robert Kennedy. But by virtue of changing 
contexts, the phrase no longer has an ambiguous reference in a 1986 campaign. 
"Kennedy" does not indeed have the same dictionary meaning as "Edward Kennedy," 
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but if we can discover the reference by identifying the context where the sentence was 
uttered, we will have interpreted its authorial meaning beyond the "textual meaning" 
defined in Beardsley's terms. Again, the phrase is ambiguous only if it is taken as an 
instance of langue. 
Indeed, Beardsley admits that the discovery of the "textual meaning" and the discovery 
of the authorial meaning are two distinct inquiries. Only, "the proper task of the literary 
interpreter is to interpret textual meaning" (1977, 32). He opposes the aesthetic to the 
historical approach (1970, 34), instead of integrating hem in a historicist aesthetics. 
And his conclusion is inevitably contradictory: on e hand, a carte blanche for the 
critic to draw the limits of a poem in an act which s aesthetically motivated (42); on the 
other, a claim for the complete autonomy of the poem and the passivity of the critic. 
(43). That literary discourse is highly conventionalized does not mean that it ceases to 
be a historical parole. Its contexts are standardized to a degree, but not to just any 
degree, as the New Critical aesthetics would have it. 
A historically conscious aesthetics is richer than one which ignores historical 
considerations. Indeed, it includes the latter as aparticular historical attitude to art. It is 
significant that Beardsley cannot help assuming the historically and genetically 
conscious viewpoint when he tries to refute Hirsch' t eory. His three theses against the 
identity of meaning and authorial meaning are, of course, correct, but they do not prove 
what they set out to prove, that any construction of meaning justified by "the text itself" 
is a valid interpretation. Argument number one runs thus: "Some texts that have been 
formed without the agency of an author, and hence without authorial meaning, 
nevertheless have a meaning and can be interpreted" (1970, 18). Misprints and poems 
composed by computers are examples of this. What Berdsley does not conclude is that 
if we learn that a verbal phenomenon is the result of a misprint or has been generated by 
a computer, we have gained an insight into the nature of that phenomenon and the kind 
of "language game" of which it is an instance. "When Hart Crane wrote 'Thy Nazarene 
and tender eyes,' a printer's error transformed it into 'Thy Nazarene and tinder eyes,' but 
Crane let the accidental version stand" (1970, 18). The difference between a willed 
meaning and a printer's error is not irrelevant, as Beardsley seems to suggest. Printer's 
errors are suppressed in revised editions, and what Hart Crane did in this case was to 
transform a printer's error into an authorial meaning by means of an act of will which is 
known and recognized. 
The second of Beardsley's objections is that the meanings of words change historically, 
and therefore the authorial meaning becomes distinct from the textual meaning. In his 
example, Mark Akenside writes in 1744 of how God "rais'd his plastic arm." Beardsley 
comments that the line has acquired a new meaning i our century, but apparently he 
does not rule out the interpretations which ignore this fact because they are concerned 
with today's textual meaning. It is not clear to me in which context a critic can 
deliberately ignore this difference and still lay a cl im to be interpreting Akenside's 
poem. Hirsch would call this activity "rewriting," and I agree with him. 
The third objection is that a text can have meanings that its author is not aware of 
(Beardsley 1970, 20). So much the better for the interpreter. But this claim presupposes 
that we can tell apart what an author is aware of and what he is not aware of--that we 
can isolate the interpretation of the authorial meaning as a distinct phase of the critical 
activity. Hirsch, I think, does not ask for more. After this, it is only to be wished that an 
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evaluation of the text does not ignore this conceptual difference we have all started 
with. I am afraid Beardsley is all too ready to do this. 
Since my interpretive assumptions are dangerously close to Hirsch's, maybe it is the 
moment to make the differences between them more explicit. Some are terminological 
and some are conceptual. 
- Terminologically, I have tried to maintain the normal usage of the terms while 
carefully distinguishing the conceptual differences. My use of "meaning" and 
"significance" are closer to Hirsch's use in The Aims of Interpretation; whenever I wish 
to be more specific I will use "authorial meaning." Hirsch's "criticism" is concerned 
only with valuation and significance (1967, 9), and as such is opposed to 
"interpretation," which is concerned only with establishing (authorial?) meaning. 
Sometimes he draws a difference between "understanding" as the construction of 
meaning and "interpretation" as its explanation (1967, 136). I think it is more 
convenient to think of "criticism" as the sum of interpretation and valuation, and to be 
concerned with both meaning and significance. Interpretation is not restricted to the 
fixation of authorial meaning. I think that in the current usage of the word it is also 
concerned with meaning at large or with the significance of texts. Therefore we should 
speak of "interpretation of authorial meaning," "interpretation of meaning" or 
"interpretation of significance" whenever we wish to be more specific. 
- Conceptually:  
1) We can borrow Ingarden's term "concretization" (1973, 322) to refer to the whole 
construction of meaning to which the interpretation may ultimately be assumed to refer 
to, as opposed to those aspects of the construction it actually refers to. This distinction 
draws a necessary wedge into the first term in the opposition drawn by Hirsch between 
"the construction of meaning to which the intepretation refers" and "the meaning of an 
interpretation" (1967, 129). Sometimes Hirsch does speak of "the whole meaning to 
which [different compatible interpretations] refer." (44). 
2) Hirsch's notion of the historical fixity of a text is linked to his theory in a deficient 
way. There is one sense in which the author's meaning is not a desideratum--every critic 
reaches it, or measures his distance to it. To this extent, Hirsch's rejection of the concept 
of Horizontverschmelzung used in Gadamer's historicist hermeneutics (Gadamer 1977) 
is justified. (45). Through this concept, Gadamer rejects the idea of a fixed sense in 
texts, and stresses the fact that our constructon of a author's meaning is already gided 
by our position and aims as interpreters. But this concept cannot have more than a 
purely metatheorical value Its role is justified in Gadamer's philosophical study. In 
actual interpretation, however, we cannot have an access to the author's pole to verify 
the extent of the difference between our horizon and his; and in one way or another we 
will have to posit our own conception of authorial meaning. This cannot be done with 
respect to an unknown pole, a noumenon outside our reach. There is then no ultimate 
contradiction between Gadamer and Hirsch, since Gadamer's "relativism" cannot have 
any possible bearing on actual interpretation. 
Hirsch is right in saying that ultimately the possibility of academic discussion rests on 
the conceptual difference between (authorial) meaning and significance. But every critic 
articulates in a different way the proportion alloted in his interpretation to (authorial) 
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meaning and to significance. "If a Marxist critic construes a text differently from a 
formalist critic," Hirsch argues, "that is an irrelevant accident. No perspectival necessity 
requires him to do so. Marxist critics and formalist critics may be equally able to 
understand what a text means" (1976, 44). This is of course too optimistic. The most 
significant differences in interpretation do not deriv  from the critics drawing different 
significances from the same work, but from the facttha  they can hardly said to be 
evaluating and interpreting the significance of "the same" work--their assumptions 
about the authorial meaning are widely divergent. Hirsch's argument seems to place the 
main critical contention in the determination of significance, which is variable, while 
authorial meaning, being historically fixed, could be approached objectively. This 
account ignores the fact that history is continually being revised and rewritten, and that 
this rewriting is itself a matter of ideological contention--hardly a basis on which to 
ground a critical consensus. Preserving the conceptual difference between authorial 
meaning, meaning and significance is fundamental, but only as a methodological 
principle. This conceptual difference will never be, as such, a basis for critical 
unanimity. The author's meaning did exist as a historical fact, but this does not have the 
slightest theoretical importance unless it is recognized to be a relevant intepretive 
element in the theoretical assumptions of the readers and critics. (Authorial) meaning 
and significance are critical constructs, and the subject of critical debate. Interpretations 
do have elements in common--but usually, different intepretations share just some 
assumptions about the work's total sum of (authorial) meaning and significance, not the 
whole of it. And here once again Gadamer's (1977) reflections on the pre-understanding 
which directs the direction of interpretation are relevant. This does not mean that 
Hirsch's probabilistic notion of the historical existence of authorial meaning is not 
necessary. On the contrary, it is indispensable as a regulative concept. (46). But it does 
not work exactly the way he puts it, nor does it work the way radical historicism would 
put it. In the last analysis historical meaning is always determined with respect to the 
critic's own historical position; his object is partly built for him by his own age and 
culture. The result of the scholar's investigation of the author's meaning is not authorial 
meaning in se, which is a historical or cultural noumenon, but rather the way in which 
we must conceive of that meaning in our own interprtive situation, taking into account 
the ways in which we conceive of other aspects of the author's cultural context. That is, 
the scholar's function is to make our assumptions about the past (or areas of knowledge 
in general) fit with each other, to insure that the past remains accessible as an object of 
knowledge. The critic's interpretation of authorial meaning is not a textual time 
machine, because we never relinquish a holistic coneption about the past which is 
inevitably grounded in the present. What the critic's work seeks ultimately is not to 
uncover a noumenon, but to ensure the translatability etween the concepts in his own 
area of knowledge and those of the larger cultural context of his own age. Our 
understanding of the relevant features of the past is constantly changing, and an author's 
activity must be reinterpreted in the light of this new understanding of the past and of 
other cultures. 
However, Hirsch is right in observing that there is nothing intrinsically different about 
"the past" as an object of scholarly inquiry--another culture, another present-day 
conception require just the same kind of interpretive work. These objections against 
Hirsch's notion of objectivity, then, are not the radical historicist objections he seeks to 
refute. (47). The meaning of the other must be understood in the ot r's own terms. But 
we are unlikely to agree with all of our fellow critics on the precise nature of those 
terms. My contention against Hirsch's notion of objectivism is that different critics may 
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share Hirsch's interpretive assumptions, be perfectly right in doing so, and yet fail to 
reach agreement: the heterogeneity of present-day perspectives adduced by Hirsch as a 
support to his argument against radical historicism (1976, 41) can draw a line right 
across the middle of English departments. Two scholars may validate quite different 
interpretations of authorial meaning. This is possible because the objectively sharable 
interpretive assumptions are not an algorythm for interpretation. Hirsch knows this: 
"The notion that a reliable methodology of intrerprtation can be built upon a set of 
canons is. . . a mirage" (1967, 203). Or: "There can be no canons of construction, but 
only canons which help us to choose between alternative [authorial] meanings that have 
already been construed from the text" (1967, 204). And yet he fails to draw the 
implications, drawn by a misguided notion of what objectivity and knowledge are. 
Knowledge is not ideologically neutral--it is, willy-nilly, at the service of ideological 
positions which make it possible and relevant in the first place. An age's conception of 
the past is not a monolithic, neutral construct. There is no agreement about the past--it is 
used as a metaphor for the present. A necessary metaphor, not one which is deliberate 
or wilfully distorting. The past is one of the languages of the present, and very often the 
interpretation carries the marks of its origin, of the project that made it possible For 
Horton, "interpretation will always be colored, or even determined, by present needs, 
and will always be as much re-creation as it is retrieval" (1979, 3). The post-structuralist 
enthusiasm of this affirmation needs to be toned down with another post-structuralist 
claim: the interpretation will only carry those signs if a further interpreter identifies 
them there. This is not always the case, but it is always a conceptual possibility. 
Interpretation takes place in the space between. Hirsch claims that "ideology is far more 
likely to determine the results of inquiry when theinquirer assumes that it must do so" 
(1976, 149). It is useful to keep this in mind. Not merely as a good piece of advice 
(which it is, in a way) but also as a cautionary insta ce of the opposite danger: believing 
in the possibility of neutrality is already an ideological claim; it is, moreover, a naive 
one, one that may make us assume that only "the others" ave an ideological axe to 
grind. Instead, objectivity must be used as a purely regulative concept. Hirsch's 
objectivity is not purely regulative, since he believes in it as the final, practical result of 
the interpreter's activity. 
Interpreting a text is an ethical question, but not i  the way Hirsch would have it (cf. 
1976, 90). There are ethical choices relevant to the interpretive activity which are 
previous to it and wider than a local compromise to be a faithful interpreter. 
Interpretation is of a a piece with the interpreter's overall ethical, political and generally 
cultural situation, the one which gives him his view of the text, which makes him 
capable of having an attitude towards it in the first place. The utmost respect for the text 
is necessary to all kinds of intepreters, if the int rpretation aims at the strongest possible 
engagement with culture at large, including the intrpreter's own project. But this will 
never result in a final agreement about the (authorial) meaning of the text. The past, as 
well as other cultures and attitudes, are the object of ideological contention just like the 
present and our own culture. That is why the idea of an objective value or validation is 
suspect. But there is something like objective knowledge. It is the basis of agreement 
which is indispensable for either further agreement or disagreement. We can always 
agree on what it is that we disagree about, and this already provides a significant degree 
of conceptual sharability. 
Hirsch believes in the difference between validation and interpretation of meaning. 
Validation is always provisional and relative to the current state of knowledge, but it 
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nevertheless aspires to a cognitive rank superior to that of interpretation: "A validation 
has to show not merely that an interpretation is plausible, but that it is the most plausible 
one available" (1967, 172). But a validation will also have to rely on a construction of 
the text as a measure for the different interpretations. At one point or another, the 
scholar's own construction of the text must determine whether a phenomenon is relevant 
or not, whether it counts as evidence of authorial intention or not. And at this point, 
validation becomes interpretation again. Its epistemological privilege over interpretation 
is one of degree and circumstance. Just as there ar no privileged criteria for the 
evaluation of literary works (Hirsch 1976, 122) there is no absolute criterion to judge 
the validity of an interpretation. The work must be read in order to privilege one 
criterion of validation against the others, and it cannot be read from a neutral stance. 
Hirsch himself recognizes that new evidence or an analysis of the critic's reasoning may 
lead to a revision of the validation. But Sparshott is far more direct when he says that 
"there are no critical courts of last appeal" (1976, 14). This conception of interpretation 
also makes allowance for a more flexible approach, one which does not completely 
exclude the hypothetical, the provisional and the tentative form the heuristic activity. As 
Dennett puts it, fiction and role-playing are a necessary element in interpretation: when 
I interpret, "the state I put myself in is not belief but make-believe belief" (1987, 100). 
The ideal of a universally valid interpretation is then most seriously compromised by 
the partial relativity of the concept of authorial meaning and its dependence on 
ideological strife. Hirsch seems to sense this, and that is why he distinguishes between a 
theorical aim of criticism (to achieve truth) and a pr ctical aim, which is "agreement 
that truth has probably been reached" (1967, ix, 17f.). He believes that his noumenal 
criterion of truth does not impair its function in the system: "we can have the truth 
without being certain that we have it" (1967, 173). This is not very satisfactory, because 
it does not leave any room for a clear difference between truth and falsity. In fact, an 
objective interpretation as understood by Hirsch is a contradictio in adjecto . But an 
objectivist definition of truth need not posit a Tomistic correspondence between the 
intellect and the thing-in-itself. That is, the theor tical aim of criticism need not (and of 
course must not) be different from its practical aim: we need a criterion of objective 
truth which is different from Hirsch's, since his cannot be met. Humanistic disciplines 
do provide knowledge (it is Hirsch's main aim to maint in the idea that they do), but it 
is knowledge which does not need to be universally accepted. (48). Interpretations do 
not need to be "objective" either in the sense of being universally acceptable, or in the 
sense of being grounded in the nature of things, although they do need to have a thrust 
towards objectivity--to be objective in the only workable sense of the word. They need 
this in order to be convincing in the right context, since sadly enough what passes for 
universal truth is in fact the result of widespread agreement in an interpretive 
community. And widespread agreement in an interpretive community can only be 
reached by meeting that community's truth requirements: Aristotle noted that truth is a 
quite convincing rhetorical strategy. The academy needs, and has, criteria of validity 
and objectivity. They are not arbitrary, since they ensure that the functions of the 
institution be met--in fact, they rest on the very notion of agreement and 
communication. (49). I propose that the most widespread and effective crit rion of 
objective truth is the (increased) translatability of knowledge from one cognitive 
medium, discipline or context to another. Accordingly, interpretation is the breaking 
down of complex semiotic objects into others which are more at hand; showing how a 
new or complex code can be translated into other codes which are more fixed, 
accessible, or better known. This is in essence nothi g new: Aristotle already defined 
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the process by which we acquire knowledge as the translation of the unknown into the 
known. In the Aristotelian view, interpretation consists the subsuming of particulars 
under universals (cf. Raval 1981, 43); that is, it is a form of translation. Of course, 
Aristotle's concept of interpretation is too abstractive and essentialist for us; the earlier 
view is more flexible. And it is further complicated by the fact that there is no universal 
proof that translatability between two areas of knowledge has been increased. The 
interpreters must agree not only on the data, but also on the rules for the validity of 
translation. These may be analyzed into data, but only according to further rules. 
Hermeneutic demonstration is always only partial, and has to rely ultimately on shared 
assumptions. Translatability is not increased in the void, but only in a particular 
institutional context. 
Academic criticism is such a context--or group of cntexts. The bulk of academic 
interpretation of literary texts in the American tradition from the forties on follows these 
steps: 
A paraphrasis of the most important elements of the action. When this phase is missing, 
it is taken for granted that the critic and his read r share the current assumptions about 
which is the relevant action-scheme. Although it israrely acknowledged in an explicit 
way, this summary is already a part of the interpretation. 
The establishment of semantic isotopies in the action, he narrative and the discourse 
levels. (50). Usually, an interpretation will call attention to details which the critic 
thinks may have been overlooked by the reader, and will show how they exhibit the 
same logic which organizes the main articulations of the action which have been 
foregrounded in its paraphrasis. We can see thus the history of the interpretations of a 
work as a gradual colonization of areas of resistance, and also a gradual uncovering of 
new problems. The work of all the critics is not wholly compatible, but later critics 
benefit from the insight of the previous ones, and often borrow the ideas of a rival 
interpretation for their own purposes. Practical interpretation, like savage thought (and 
like theory itself) is essentially bricolage. 
The author's narrative is filtered through the criti 's text; or, to use another metaphor, 
the critic's narrative is superimposed on the author's. A clear pattern thus emerges. The 
initial ambiguity of the story has become tractable for the purposes of the critic, and the 
new coherence given the story by the isotopies traced ross its structure gives authority 
to the interpretation. A price is paid, however (Horton 1979): the interpretation 
systematically excludes or leaves untouched those elements which do not fit into the 
critic's grid. But this becomes simply a stimulus to devise a still more comprehensive 
interpretation, one that includes those elements which were left aside by previous 
interpreters. (51). The critic's narrative is finally assumed to be th essence of the 
author's, to have uncovered or reinforced its central meaning. A scheme of the whole 
work has emerged which invariably looks more accurate and meaningful than the 
paraphrase of the action furnished by the critic at the beginning of his essay. The next 
heuristic maneuver is the substitution of this parah se for the author's work as the 
object of interpretation. 
Usually, an iconic or analogical relationship is established between the isotopical 
version of the work produced by the critic and a literary statement or series of 
statements which summarize an outlook, message or world-view present in the work. 
 García Landa – Authorial intention 20 
Depending on the interpretive school the critic adheres to, the producer of this literary 
statement is the author, the author's unconscious, the collective unconscious, the 
author's culture, social class, epoch, gender, etc., the language of the work, or even the 
critic himself (assuming that there is any differenc  between these two possibilities). 
The extent to which this statement is taken to be cons ious or deliberate on the part of 
the author will vary accordingly. For instance, thecritics of Stephen Crane's story "The 
Monster" almost invariably point to "Crane" as the author of the literary statements they 
interpret in the story. (52). This is not to assume that Crane is always supposed t  have 
thought of the literary statement in as many words. The literary statement is precisely 
stated by playing on the conventions of literature; it is the function of the critic to 
translate this statement from the language of literature to its implications on morality, 
social life, or politics; to make explicit in the language of criticism the analogical or 
iconic significance of the story. The statements formulated by these critics can therefore 
be said to reflect the authorial intention of the work, even if that intention was not 
formulated linguistically. The semantic isotopies isolated by the critic constitute a 
provisional semiotic code of their own. Together with the more general conventions of 
literature, this code is the original language of the literary statement. Sometimes, a 
detailed equivalence is drawn between the action and some of the cultural myths shared 
by the interpreter and the author (in the case of "The Monster," mainly the Bible and 
American history). Although many critics hesitate to use the word "allegory," this kind 
of interpretation is far more common than we might suppose. 
  
Coherence is desirable, and it will always be the aim of the intepreter. But the scope in 
which coherence is achieved may be more or less wide. The doctrine of the "Intentional 
Fallacy," aiming at defining a specifically literary kind of interpretation, conventionally 
restricts the scope of interpretation in a way which is no longer acceptable today. When 
concentrating on the fascinating task of producing oherence inside the text, we should 
be careful not to disrupt another kind of coherence which is just as essential: that which 
exists between the text and its author, or between th  textual image of the author and 
our conception of the personality of the author, of his age and his culture. All may be 
considered to be textual representations if we wish--of the all-encompassing text of 
History. A theory of interpretation should aim at making sense of literature within this 
enlarged context, and construct a representation which conciliates our sense of the 
internal voice of the text with the voices which join in the chorus, coming from other 
strands of the literary tradition, from the social context in which our interpretation takes 
place, from history at large, which is the largest of the interpretive contexts we share. It 
is in the arena of history where collective intentio s are shaped and internalized, thereby 
framing our interpretations from very premisses. It is also the locus where interpretive 
theories can be considered as texts and objects of interpretation subject to a generalized 
hermeneutics. A maximum of attention to this larger context is our best way to strive for 










1. I follow Dennett (1978) and Searle (1983a) in capitalizing the wider, specifically 
phenomenological sense of "Intentionality" (and "Intentional"). Back 
2. According to Searle, "Intentional states represent objects and states of affairs in the 
same sense of 'represent' that speech acts represent obj cts and states of affairs" (Searle 
1983a, 4). As it stands, this statement is false, du  to Searle's (deliberate?) bracketing of 
his own theory. But I will assume throughout this type of statements mean something 
like "the same metalinguistic apparatus can be usedfor the representation of speech acts 
and Intentional states." With this proviso, see Searle 1983a, 4-13 for a comparison of 
speech acts and Intentional acts, in terms of propositional content, direction of fit, 
conditions of satisfaction, etc. Back 
3. Both secondary and original, not derived (in the above mentioned sense). Back 
4. In Virginia Woolf, Roger Fry, qtd. in Redpath 1976, 14. Cf. also Watson 1976, 163.
Back 
5. There are other important statements of this position by Valéry (see Scholes 1990, 
54), by Frye (1957, 86), Sontag (1966, 9), Barthes (1977a) and Derrida (1988). Back 
6. Newton-De Molina 1976, xvi. See also the varying interpretations of the scope of the 
"intentional fallacy" by the other contributors to this volume. Back 
7. It is also this kind of anti-intentionalism whic is found in the aestheticians (such as 
Eliseo Vivas) who conceive of creation as an explorati n or discovery which is not the 
result of a pre-existing intention. Back 
8. Fowler 1976, 242. Cf. Horton's view that intentio  s a complex concept that works 
differently in each level of the work's structure (1976, 104). Back 
9. In Wimsatt and Beardsley's article there is no suggestion of a relation between 
intention and the use of public conventions. Nor, f instance, in relatively recent work 
such as Horton's (1979, 106). Back 
10. Cf. Bateson 1953, 14; R. S. Crane 1953, 166, 169; Sparshott 1976, 108; Peckham 
1976, 148; Watson 1976, 164f.; Close 1976, 182; Skinner 1976, 213; Hirsch, 1976, 87, 
Raval 1981, 46, de Man 1983, 25. While repeating some f the earlier injunctions, 
Wimsatt's revision of his position a quarter of a century later is somewhat more careful 
and, above all, it recognizes the legitimity of interpretations based on an intention found 
"in the work itself" (1976, 128). Still, there is only moderate interest in the author's 
meaningthe doctrine is still essentially the same. Back 
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11. Redpath 1976, 15 f. Cf. Hirsch 1967, 233; Skinner 1976, 213. Back 
12. Wimsatt and Beardsley 1967, 5. That this is not the case is convincingly argued in 
Peckham 1976. Back 
13. Wimsatt and Beardsley 1967, 6. Beardsley's Ae thetics reintroduced, nevertheless, 
the difference between interpretation and evaluation; and later Wimsatt recognizes the 
convenience of recognizing such a conceptual distinctio  (1976, 126). 
14. On langue and parole, see Saussure 1949; but also Segre 1985, 190ff. Back 
15. This explains why Hirsch believes that "the intentional fallacy has no proper 
application whatever to verbal meaning" and that Wimsatt and Beardsley ultimately 
respect the author's meaning (Hirsch 1967, 12). Back 
16. Cf. Fiedler 1952, 259, 273; Cioffi 1976, 60; Roma 1976, 77f. In Hirsch's view, "it is 
unsound to insist on deriving all inferences from the ext itself" (1967, 241); for her 
part, Horton notes that "knowledge of the conditions f composition alters 
interpretation" (1979, 95). Back 
17. This is also Peckham's (1976, 141), Fowler's (1976, 249) and Raval's (1981, 59) 
interpretation of Wimsatt and Beardsley's doctrine. Back 
18. This is still Wimsatt's view in his revision of his early doctrine. See his comments 
on Hirsch's analysis of Blake's "London" (Wimsatt 1976, 130ff.). Back 
19. Cioffi notes that Wimsatt and Beardsley's notion of what is "in" the text is deceitful, 
because "externals" of several kinds, often biographical, are always introduced to reach 
an acceptable intepretation (1976, 68). Cf. also Roma 1976, 81; Harris 1988, 30. Back 
20. Some critics have taken the "intentional fallacy" to refer to interpretation, in spite of 
Wimsatt and Beardsley's stated definition (e.g. Cioffi 1976, 57). Of course, its "indirect" 
connections with interpretation finally compromise ts the authors' claims to an 
objective standard of valuation. Sparshott (1976, 108) notes that this version of 
antiintentionalism, in its exclusive aesthetic concer , forgets that the work of art is a 
human work, and not merely an aesthetic object. Back 
21. Dewey 1934; Redpath 1976, 19. Back 
22. Cf. Wimsatt 1976, 128; Watson 1976, 69. Back 
23. Cf. Crane 33. This kind of criticism which deliberately ignores the author's meaning 
need not be just an aesthetic play on the part of the critic; cf. Spivak 244-245. Back 
24. Newton-De Molina 1976, x. Cf. Peckham 1976, 140. Back 
25. Hermeden 1975, 81. Qtd. in Raval 1981, 265. Back 
26. Hirsch 1976, 90. According to Hirsch, it is thelack of a higher institutional authority 
in literary criticism which explains the relevance of authorial meaning. In religious or 
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legal texts, special interpretive conventions ensure the control of authority over the 
meaning of the texts. But it is wrong to extend the principle of unlimited meaning to 
texts which do not have these institutional constraints (1967, 123). However, what is 
relevant in the institutional constraints of interpretation is not the structure of authority 
(which is after all a check) but the uses to which multiplicity of meaning is put. The 
institutional function of the academic study of literature as it stood in the New Critical 
conception was in this sense perfectly in keeping with their interpretive practices: a 
controlled proliferation of meaning and the hypostatization of literature are related and 
mutually sympathetic conceptions. Back 
27. Newton-De Molina 1976, xi. Newton-De Molina draws this notion from Robson 
(1966). Cf. Hirsch 1967, 133, 140; Wimsatt 1976, 126; Fowler 1976, 252. Back 
28. Roma 1976, 82. For Beardsley or for Robert Graves, the richest meaning is the best 
(Fowler 1976, 252). Sparshott (1976, 111) also believ s that the "best" and most 
comprehensive interpretation is the right one, while at the same time he defends the 
criterion of the authorial intention. Back 
29. On the "life" of a literary work, see Ingarden (1973, ch. 13). Back 
30. Hirsch 1967, 237. Hirsch believes, however, that is very probable that the right 
intepretation is "the one which makes the most elemnts functional" (1967, 190). 
Horton has criticised the assumption that an interpretation ought to take every element 
of the poem to be the result of a unified logic of c mposition, or that the best 
interpretation is the one that makes most elements active (1979, 4ff.. Cf. also Fowler 
1976, 252). Back 
31. Cf. Crane 1953, 179. Back 
32. Hirsch (1976: 103) quotes Kant's Critique of Judgement, sec. XXI of the "Analytic." 
Back 
33. Hirsch's interpretive theory is not his own in an exclusive way. It is based on the 
practical assumptions of many critics, as well as on the theories of Schleiermacher, 
Boeckh, Dilthey, Frege, Husserl, Popper and Betti. Many other theorists, such as F. W. 
Bateson or M. H. Abrams, have defended positions similar to Hirsch's in the English-
speaking academia. Back 
34. The first version of Hirsch's terminology concerning the concepts of meaning, 
significance, interpretation and criticism is preserved by Harris (1988). Back 
35. Hirsch 1967, 49. Hirsch goes on to say that the actual words in a sentence are types. 
Peirce's notion of token (the particular instance or manifestation of a type) would be 
more accurate. Back 
36. Hirsch 1976, 49. This is also Peckham's argument (1976, 143). Peckham points out 
some fascinating analogies between the New Critical conception of semantic autonomy 
and the dogma of transubstantiation. Back 
37. Hirsch 1967, 254 ff.; 1976, 49, 81 ff. Cf. Sparshott 1976, 113. Back 
 García Landa – Authorial intention 24 
38. Blanchot 1955, 202; see de Man 1983, 63ff. Back 
39. Cf. also Skinner 1976, 219. Back 
40. Hirsch 1967, 236. Cf. Sparshott 1976, 112; Fowler 1976, 255. Back 
41. Hirsch 1967, 17. Cf. Searle's argument against Derrida's deconstruction of speech 
act theories (1983b, 78). Back 
42. "Therefore whatever interest comes from without, b  yet can be taken as an 
interesting extension of what is surely in, may be admissible. It merely makes a larger 
whole" (Beardsley 1970, 36). Back 
43. "The literary text, in the final analysis, is the determiner of its meaning. It has a will, 
or at least a way, of its own. The sense it makes . . . is what it offers for our aesthetic 
contemplation" (Beardsley 1970, 37). Back 
44. Hirsch 1967, 132; my italics. The distinction between the construction of meaning 
to which an interpretation refers and the concretization of a work can also be compared 
with Beardsley's opposition between "local" and "regional" meanings; the latter belong 
to "the work as a whole or some large part of it" (1970, 44). Back 
45. The concept of Horizontverschmelzung is endorsed by many theorists, e.g. Palmer 
1969, 120; Horton 1979, 123; Wellek 1979, 577; qtd.in Raval 1981, 265. An even more 
extreme relativist formulation is put forward in Michaels (1980). Back 
46. See Horton 1979, 5, and Derrida himself (section 2.5.1 below). Back 
47. See Hirsch 1967, 40ff., 245ff.; 1976, 38ff. Back 
48. In this it is not essentially different from scientific knowledge--only in the kind of 
use to which it is put. Knowledge of any kind does not need universal acceptance. It 
works in specific contexts and is irrelevant elsewhre. Back 
49. Cf. Hirsch's principle of the sharability of verbal meaning (1967, 31ff.). Back 
50. On the notion of isotopy, see Greimas 1966, 88ff. On the levels of narrative and 
discourse, cf. Bal's "story" and "text" (Bal 1985). Back 
51. It is clear that beyond a certain point this activity is made possible only by a very 
specific set of assumptions about the nature of literature and the proper function of 
criticism. The extreme version I describe is historically localized in the Anglo-American 
New Critical tradition, to which practically all the interpretations of "The Monster" 
belong. The "intentional fallacy" doctrine should perhaps be considered as a carte 
blanche to push this practice to its limits without any qualms about the limitations of the 
author or the historical status of the meanings thu"retrieved." Back 
52. Cf. my article on the interpreters of Stephen Crane (1989). Back 
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